Security Incident: Gemini Spark Appears to Expose URLs from Other Users' Sessions

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I believe there may be a serious security/privacy issue with Gemini Spark.

While using Gemini Spark’s remote computer environment, I observed URLs belonging to websites that I did not open or request myself appearing in the Chromium Task Manager.

The attached screenshot shows multiple Subframe processes containing URLs from various unrelated websites. These appear to be associated with other browsing activity rather than my own session.

This raises a serious concern that URLs or browsing activity from other users’ Gemini Spark sessions may be exposed to another user.

If these URLs are indeed coming from other users’ sessions, this could constitute a cross-user data isolation / privacy breach.

Could the Gemini Spark team please investigate:

  1. Whether Chromium processes or browser sessions are properly isolated between users.

  2. Why unrelated website URLs are visible in the Task Manager.

  3. Whether URLs, browser history, cookies, session data, or other information from other users could also be exposed.

  4. Whether this is an isolated UI/process issue or an actual cross-user security boundary violation.

I have attached a screenshot demonstrating the issue.

This should be investigated as a potential security incident because URLs can contain sensitive information, including private paths, query parameters, tokens, or other user-specific data.

I would appreciate confirmation from the Gemini Spark team regarding whether this behavior is expected or represents a security vulnerability.

2

Hello, I see that your post has yet to be addressed;

It is completely understandable why seeing unexpected URLs in Chromium’s Task Manager looks alarming at first glance, but what you are seeing is almost certainly Chromium’s Site Isolation architecture in action rather than session cross-contamination.

What may be happening: Even if you didn’t navigate directly to those domains, any page visited by the remote browser (or loaded by background helper extensions) that embeds scripts, tracking pixels, or frames from those origins will spawn its own isolated subframe line item. They belong entirely to the current browser’s execution tree, not another user’s session.

Raising security questions is always valid, but if you do ever discover evidence of actual cross-tenant boundary bleed or data exposure, the best route is to report it confidentially through Google Bug Hunters or another internal, generally safe route. Public threads make it harder to handle sensitive disclosures safely, whereas Bug Hunters routes directly to the dedicated security triage engineers.

Stay safe, and good luck!